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Abstract: The problem of optimal management of a water reservoir by a hydropower 
producer is necessarily a dynamic one since water can be transferred between periods. A 
hydropower producer being a monopolist cannot reduce output in the classical way 
without spilling water. He will follow a strategy of setting marginal revenues equal 
between time periods and thus shift water from relatively inelastic periods to relatively 
elastic ones. If the monopolist has thermal capacity the strategy is the same, but the 
utilization of thermal capacity is reduced. If the monopolist has control over external 
trade import is reduced and export increased compared with the social solution. 
Technical constraints of limited reservoir and interconnector capacity and a competitive 
fringe may reduce markedly the consequences of exercising market power. 
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The deregulation of the electricity power production system in many countries since the 
early 1990ies has stimulated interest in the possibilities of producers behaving 
strategically.  The classical implication of use of market power that production is 
reduced compared with perfect competition, also holds for electricity markets being 
supplied by conventional thermal power. Typical base-load plants like nuclear power 
plants do not have the same physical opportunities due to long and expensive start-up 
and close-down times. Systems with a significant contribution from hydropower with 
storage of water have n ot been studied so much.  However, hydropower plays a 
significant part in many countries. About 20 % of the world’s electricity is produced by 
hydro power, and 1/3 of countries in the world depend on hydropower for more than 50 
% of their electricity generation (www.hydropower.org). Hydropower with water 
storage has features that set it apart from other generating technologies concerning 
possibilities of exercising market power. The almost costless instantaneous change in 
hydro generation within the effect capacities makes it perfect for strategic actions in 
competition with thermal generators with both costs and time lags involved in changing 
production levels of the latter. In countries with day ahead spot markets hydro 
producers interact daily and they all know that operating output-depending costs are 
zero, the opportunity cost is represented by future expected market prices and they may 
hold quite similar expectations. This may facilitate collusion. In the case of hydropower 
production can only be reduced by using less water. This may lead to spillage of water 
when reservoirs are limited and inflows positive. Spilling water has the same logic as 
burning coffee beans to support the coffee price of a cartel, but it is also easy observable 
and may be met with regulatory action, since spilling water from reservoirs is obviously 
not part of a social solution (if technically avoidable). The reason for the concern about 
potential market power abuse of hydro producers is that it may be used without any 
spilling of  water and not so easy to detect by regulators, because market power is 
typically exercised by a reallocation of release of water on periods compared with what 
would be the socially desired release pattern. Measuring existence of market power by 
comparing price and marginal costs does not work for hydropower since variable cost is 
virtually zero. The relevant variable cost is the opportunity cost of water, but this is an 
expected variable and not directly observable.    3
Although there is some recent literature covering market power by hydro producers, the 
topic deserves a closer scrutiny and systematic review. Use of market power by hydro 
producers is covered in Ambec and Doucet (2003) and Crampes and Moreaux (2001) 
using very simplifying assumptions. A two-period model is considered in both models 
and the standard result of a monopoly following the strategy of equalising marginal 
revenues of the periods, resulting in a reallocation of water from periods with relative 
inelastic demand to periods with relatively  more elastic demand, is established. A 
constraint on the transferability of water from one period to the next is not considered. 
Borenstein et al. (2002) investigated the possible use of market power by hydro 
producers when thermal capacities are also present at the backdrop of the California 
crisis. The formal model is the same as the model in Bushnell (2003) dealing with 
strategic scheduling of the hydro producer with different assumptions about the 
behaviour of the thermal producers. When a monopolist controls thermal capacities, the 
equalisation of the marginal revenue rule over the periods is confirmed.  
 
In Section 2 the case of a hydro monopoly is analysed based on a basic water 
availability constraint establishing the nature of water shifting. Discrete time is used 
here and in the rest of the paper. Opening up for export- and import is studied in Section 
3, both without and with limits on the amount of trade. The monopolist maintains the 
control of import, but takes the export price as given. The case of reservoir constraints 
not so readily found in the literature is analysed in Section 4. The case with both trade-
and reservoir constraints is addressed in Section 5, and the case of a monopoly having 
both hydro and conventional thermal capacity is studied in Section 6. A hydropower 
firm with conventional thermal plants acting as a competitive fringe is analysed in 
Section 7 and some conclusions are offered in Section 8. 
 
 
2. Monopoly  
 
In order to expose the strategies of a hydro monopolist we start with the simplest 
possible case and then increase the complexities later. As a starting point we assume 
that all hydro producers are part of a monopoly and simplify further by considering the 
monopolist as a single production unit. We assume that the monopolist knows the   4
period demand functions ()
H
tt pe  on price form with standard properties. The amount of 
electricity produced by the monopolist in period  t is 
H
t e . The profit maximisation 

























                                                                                                       (1) 
For  simplicity discounting is not performed. The horizon is T  and for operational 
planning may be one to five years. The periods may be as disaggregated as hours, but 
are usually weeks. Water W is measured in electricity units. To use a constraint as 
specified above builds on the reservoir capacity never becoming constrained, and that 
all available water arrives in the first period. This is not so unrealistic in the case of 
Norway when over 2/3 of the yearly inflow comes from melting in a few weeks 
accumulation of snow. It is usual to assume that variable operating costs of hydropower 
can be neglected, and fixed cost will not play any part in the pure management problem 
of utilising a given amount of water, W. 
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In the expression for the marginal revenue of increasing production we have introduced 
the demand flexibility, /
H
tttt pep h ¢ = (  (the inverse of the demand elasticity), which is 
negative. The condition is that the marginal revenues, expressed as flexibility-corrected   5
prices, should be equal for all the periods and equal to the shadow price on stored water. 
As in the textbook monopoly case the absolute value  of the demand flexibilities 
(demand elasticities) must be less (greater) than, or equal to, one for a unique solution to 
exist. The short-run demand may in general be on the inelastic side, so the condition on 
the price elasticities is not necessarily so innocent.  Prices may become quite high in 
order for the monopolist to be able to push demand to the elastic part of the demand 
function, and in the case of inelastic demand with vertical demand curve the monopoly 
solution characterised by (3) does not exist. Equality of marginal revenues between 
periods implies that the period with the relatively most elastic demand i.e. the smallest 
absolute value of the demand flexibilityh (
t , at the optimal quantities of electricity 
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The benchmark social planning case uses consumer and producer 
surplus,
1 0 ()
= = ￿ ￿
H
t e T





ttt t pee. The difference between the monopoly solution (3) or 
(4) and the social solution is that the flexibility-corrected price is substituted for the 
price. Compared with the solution in the social planning case the monopolist can only 
obtain higher profit than by using the common social if the demand functions differ 
over periods. If the demand functions are identical for the periods it follows from (3) 
that the flexibility-corrected prices become equal, and therefore the prices will be equal 
and equal to the common price in the social solution. However, the shadow value on the 
water resource becomes less than this price, reflecting that a monopolist considers the 
marginal revenue as the opportunity cost of using water. This difference may have 
implications in a dynamic setting of investment in new capacity. A monopoly will tend 
to expand less facing positive shifts in demand. 
 
If water is left unused we have from (3) that the shadow price of water is zero. Since the 
shadow price of water is a scalar this implies that the flexibility-corrected prices must be 
equal to zero for all periods and hence the price flexibilities equal to 1.   6
An illustration in the case of two periods, where linear demand curves are used, is 
provided in Figure 1 in the form of a bathtub diagram (Førsund, 2005). The broken 
lines are the marginal revenue curves. The length AD of the floor of the bathtub 
indicates the available water. We have that in the illustration the marginal revenue 
curves intersect at a positive value, i.e. it will not be optimal for the monopolist to leave 
any water unused. This value is the shadow value on water.  But this result depends on 
the form of the demand functions.  If we have unused water as an optimal solution, then 
the shadow water value is zero. Going vertically up to the demand curves from the 
intersection point of the marginal revenue curves gives us the monopoly prices for the 
two periods.   
 
In Figure 1 the thin dotted horizontal line 12
SS pp and the corresponding water allocation 
by the by the point M
S indicates the social solution. The shadow value of water is 
smaller in the monopoly case than in the social optimal case. If all water is to be used 
we must have in general that at least one monopoly price is lower than the social price. 
(Notice that this is not sufficient for all water to be used.) In this case, for the quantity 
corresponding to the lowest monopoly price the marginal revenue must be lower than 
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Total available energy   7
of water in the monopoly case must in general be smaller than the shadow value in the 
social planning case. If water remains unused we have that the shadow value of water is 
zero, according to the complementary slackness condition in (3). 
 
An important general result is that in the case of monopoly the market prices become 
different for the periods in contrast to the constant price in the social optimal solution 
indicated by the dotted horizontal line 12
SS pp.  For the period with the most inelastic 
demand, period 2, the price becomes higher than the social optimal price, and for the 
most elastic period, period 1, the price becomes smaller, in accordance with (5). Thus 
we have a general shifting in the utilisation of water from periods with relative inelastic 
demand to periods with relative elastic demand. The water allocation in Figure 1 moves 
from the point M
S in the social case to M
M in the monopoly case. Although the total 
electricity supply over the two periods is the same as in the social case the monopolist 
increases his profit by selling more in the most elastic period, and then partially 
reducing his revenue indicated by the area (p1
S - p1
M)AM
M on the sales in period 1, but 






The monopolist will leave water unused if it is optimal to set marginal revenues equal to 
zero. Note that since we have only one shadow price on the water resource if marginal 
revenue is to be zero in one period the marginal revenues have to be zero in all the other 
periods, too, when water is used in all periods. By changing the slope of the demand 
curves in Figure 1 slightly this case is illustrated in Figure 2. The marginal revenue 
curves do not intersect within the bathtub, and becomes zero at M1 and M2 respectively 
for the two periods. Period 1 has the relatively most elastic demand and more electricity 
is sold than in the social solution reducing the monopoly price below the social price, as 
indicated by the position of the horizontal dotted line for the social case. In period 2 the 
available water is not fully utilised; the amount M 1M2 is left unprocessed. The 
monopoly price is far above the social price.  
 
Since unused water is easy to observe it may be of interest to see what the monopoly 
solution will be if a condition of full use of the available water is made. Technically this 













Figure 2. Unused water in the monopoly case 
 
 
of the shadow price ? in (2) is not restricted anymore and the last condition in (3) is 
dropped. Marginal revenues should still be equal and equal to the water shadow price. 
Using the same demand functions and total water availability as in Figure 2 the solution 
with the water constraint as an equality constraint means that the marginal revenues 
become negative, and more water is used in both periods, resulting in lower prices in 
both periods and still unequal prices, as shown in Figure 3. The monopoly - profit is 




3. Monopoly and trade 
 
A hydro region with a regional monopoly may engage in electricity trade with 
neighbouring regions. Let us call a region for a country for ease. We will look at a 
situation where the monopolist controls both import and export, but takes the 
import/export prices as given. Unlimited trade will be assumed. Although this is 
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Figure 3. Monopoly with full resource-use constraint 
 
capacity later. Extending model (1) we have the monopoly profit maximisation problem 































                                                                                  (6) 
Here 
XI
t p is the export/import price (prices are equal and transmission cost is 
disregarded) and 
XI
t e is export if positive and import if negative. The first restriction in 
(6) is the energy balance; the consumption  xt at home may be supplied by locally 
produced hydro or by imports. Inserting the energy balance that holds as an equality 
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We assume that the amount of electricity consumed locally is positive in all periods (i.e.  
xt > 0) and that the export/import prices are all different. The second condition in (8) 
holds with equality since the export/import variable is not constrained in sign. Since the 
monopolist will not waste an export opportunity to positive a price the shadow price on 
water will be positive. If hydro is used in an import period then the first condition in (8) 
holds with equality implying that the flexibility-corrected home market price, (1) h + (
tt p , 
is equal to the shadow price on water. The second condition tells us that the flexibility-
corrected price is always equal to the import price. But since the export/import prices 
are different the shadow price on water can only be determined by  one flexibility-
corrected price. We know that in an export period we must also use hydro at home due 
to the assumption of positive consumption at home of electricity in all periods. 
Therefore in an export period the flexibility-corrected price is also equal to the shadow 
price on water. Due to lack of any restriction on trade it is the highest export price 
period that will become the only export period, and in all other periods there will be 
imports and no use of hydro at home. This means that in import periods the flexibility-
corrected price is less than the shadow price on water. 
 
An illustration is provided in Figure 4. Since the import price by construction is lowest 
in period 1 this period will be the import period. The amount of import is determined by 
the intersection of the marginal revenue curve and the import price line. The home 
market price will be higher than the import price in the standard way of a monopoly. 
Import may be regarded as an alternative way to using hydro to “produce” electricity 
(marginal revenue is set equal to the marginal production cost; the import price). In the 
export period the use at home of hydro is determined by the intersection of the marginal 
revenue curve and the export price line. Export is residually determined as the rest of 
the available water. The shadow price of water is equal to the export price. Comparing  

















Figure 4. Monopoly and trade without restrictions 
 
the monopoly solution with the socially optimal solution the latter is indicated by the 
vertical broken lines from the intersection of period 1 demand curve with the import 
price for this period, and the intersection of period 2 demand curve with the export price 
for that period. The import and export periods will be the same. The shadow price on 
water will be the same in the two solutions, but import will be considerably reduced in 
the monopoly case resulting in a higher home price than the import price. In the export 
period the monopoly will export more water and restrict correspondingly the use of 
water for electricity production at home resulting in a home price higher than the export 
price. The monopolist is playing price discrimination between two markets. 
 
Constraining the trade 
Constraining the amount traded due to limited interconnector capacity makes for a more 
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Period 1  Period 2 







































                                                                                        (9) 
The restriction on trade can be expressed by one restriction on export and another on 
import, remembering that import is negative and export positive. Inserting the energy 
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                       (11) 
We maintain the assumptions that the amount of electricity consumed at home, xt, is 
positive in all periods and that the export/import prices are all different. Looking at the 
second condition, since we either have import or export in a period the shadow prices 
on the upper and lower constraint cannot both be positive at the same time, but they 
may both be zero if the constraints are not binding. 
 
We have by assumption that in an export period we must also use hydro at home. 
Therefore in an export period the flexibility-corrected price is also equal to the shadow   13
price on water. The second condition in (11) tells us that the flexibility-corrected price 
is equal to the export price minus the shadow price on the export constraint. It will be 
arbitrary if export in each period of export is exactly equal to the constraint. In general 
there will therefore be a period when the export possibility is not fully utilised. We will 
call this period the marginal export period. But in this period the shadow price on water 
is equal to the export price. Denoting the period when the marginal export period occurs 
for t* we have: 
***** (1) hla +==-= ( XIXI
ttttt ppp                                                                                    (12) 
But the shadow price on the water resource is a scalar. It is therefore the marginal 
export period that determines this shadow price. For all the export periods with a 
binding constraint the shadow price on the upper constraint comes in positive satisfying 
the second equality in (11) for a general  t belonging to the export periods (i.e. the 
periods when the export price is higher than the price for the marginal export period). 
The shadow prices are determined such that the difference between export price and the 
corresponding shadow price is constant and equal to the shadow price on water. 
 
If hydro is used in an import period then the first condition in (11) holds with equality 
implying that the flexibility-corrected h ome market price  (1) h + (
tt p  is equal to the 
shadow price on water. The second condition tells us that the flexibility-corrected price 
is always equal to the import price plus the shadow price on the upper constraint on 
import, yielding: 
(1) hlb +==+ ( XI
tttt pp                                                                                                (13) 
But by assumption * >
XIXI
tt pp  for all periods being import periods. This means that 
hydro cannot be used in the home market in import periods unless the total import 
capacity is used. If hydro is not used in import periods the flexibility-corrected price is 
in a regular case lower than the shadow value on water and the import price is lower 
than the shadow value of water.  
 
An illustration is provided in Figure 5. Since the import price is lowest in period 1 this 
period will be the import period. The original bathtub walls are drawn with solid lines. 
Both import- and export- capacities will be fully utilised. Since the import/export price 
is lowest in period 1 this will be the import period. The import capacity is added to the 
























Figure 5. Monopoly and trade with constraints 
 
 
marginal revenue- curves are shifted to the left and anchored on the “import wall.”  In 
the export period 2 the hydro wall is shifted to the left with the length of the export 
constraint marked with the broken vertical line to the left of the hydro  wall. This 
amount will be exported. The demand- and marginal revenue- curves are shifted to the 
left with the length of the export constraint and anchored on the broken vertical line. 
The flexibility-corrected prices are equal and equal to the shadow price on water. The 
home price becomes higher than the export price in the export period, and the home 
price becomes higher than the import price in the import period. The connection 
between the shadow price on water, the import/export prices and the shadow prices on 
the trade constraints are shown in the figure. 
 
Comparing with the social solution we have in that case that both import- and export 
trade capacity will be fully utilized, but that the home price will be equal for the two 
periods indicated by the dotted horizontal line through the point of intersection between 
the demand curves for the two periods. The monopolist will use more water at home in 
the relative more price-elastic demand period 1 and accept a lower price than for the 
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relatively inelastic period he will realise a higher price than both the social price and the 
export price.  
 
 
4. Monopoly with reservoir constraint 
 
Limited transferability of water between periods is the most realistic situation for 
hydropower. An upper limit, R, on the reservoir will be introduced together with an 
accompanying water-accumulation equation. This states that the reservoir at the end of 
period t, t R , must be less (if overflow) or equal to the amount  1 t R - inherited from period 
t-1, plus the inflow wt during period t and subtracted the amount used for electricity 
production corresponding to 
H
t e . The water variables are all measured in electricity 
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The Lagrangian is:                                                                           
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 The necessary first order conditions are: 
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Assuming electricity is always supplied and introducing the demand 
flexibility, / h ¢ = ( H














                                                         (17) 
Comparing with the solution of the corresponding social planning problem the marginal 
revenue is again substituted for the marginal willingness to pay (the price). The 
flexibility-corrected price is set equal to the water value, but the water values are period 
specific, so marginal revenue may now differ over time. The second condition in (16) or 
(17), showing the dynamics of the water value, is qualitatively the same as in the social 
planning case. By  backward induction we can find the path of development for the 
water value. A general feature is that if the reservoir neither is threatened with overflow 
nor runs empty, the water value will remain constant and equal to the value in the 
terminal period. But in the monopoly case market the prices may fluctuate from period 
to period depending on changing demand functions. 
 
The terminal water value may become zero. It means that some water may be unused in 
the terminal period. If the upper reservoir constraint is not binding in the preceding 
period T-1 the water value will also be zero in this period implying that the flexibility-
corrected price is zero and water may be added to the reservoir handed to the terminal 
period. The water value can only become positive if there is a period where it is optimal 
to use up all available water. If this period is  t, then we have from (17) that 
1 0. tt ll + ‡=  The regular case will be that the water value for period t becomes positive. 
In the case of a full reservoir in a period where all the later periods have zero water 
values the water value cannot become less than zero. The shadow price on the upper 
constraint is in this case zero. Nothing is gained by expanding the reservoir limit 
marginally. If it is optimal to empty the reservoir in the terminal period, i.e. the 
marginal revenue is positive, the terminal shadow price on water becomes positive and 
the story above going backwards is repeated.  
 
The general strategy of the monopolist of shifting water use from relatively inelastic 
demand periods to relatively elastic ones will also prevail in the case of a reservoir 
constraint. Let us first assume that the monopolist will not find it profitable to spill any 
water, i.e. that the marginal revenues stay positive. The constraint on the reservoir   17
capacity will in general lead to the monopoly prices being closer to the prices in the 
social solution if the constraint is binding in the latter case. If it is optimal for a 
monopolist to have the upper constraint on the reservoir binding in a period, then this 
means that he must charge the market price given by the intersection of the demand 
curve and the vertical reservoir constraint in order to sell the available water. If the same 
amount of water is available as in the social case then the monopoly price must be equal 
to the price in social optimum. The shadow value of water must adjust downwards for 
this to be possible.  The monopolist follows the general strategy of using more water in 
elastic periods and having less water for the more inelastic periods. How this strategy 
interacts with storing more or less water than in the social planning case is connected to 
whether the reservoir build-up periods and the draw-down periods coincide with 
relatively elastic- or inelastic periods. If build-up periods coincide with relatively elastic 
demand periods there will be a tendency to reduce the number of periods with binding 
reservoir constraint. Maximal storing may become more seldom the optimal strategy for 
a monopolist.  
 
In the two-period illustration in Figure 6 the available water, including inflow and initial 
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The build-up period is period 1 with the most elastic demand. The reservoir constraint is 
not binding in the monopoly case, but was binding in the social optimal solution, as 
indicated by the dotted horizontal price lines intersecting the vertical r eservoir 
constraint through B, and we have no spillage. The allocation point for water is moved 
from B in the social case to M
M in the monopoly case. We note that the monopoly price 
in period 1 with the relatively most elastic demand becomes lower than the social 
optimal price with a binding reservoir constraint, and the monopoly price in period 2 
with relatively inelastic demand becomes higher than in the social optimal case. This is 
the general effect of shifting of water from periods with relative inelastic demand to 
periods with relatively elastic demand in the case of market power. The areas 
representing reduced income in period 1 and increased income in period 2 can easily be 
identified in Figure 6. Notice that the price differences are now quite reduced compared 
with the case of no reservoir constraint. 
 
It is often assumed that high demand period, e.g. a peak period, is the period with 
relatively most inelastic demand (Borenstein et al., 2002). However, this is an empirical 
question and should not be a ssumed without further investigations. Also in peak 
demand periods there are substitution possibilities for consumers. In a summer period 
without both heating and cooling the substitution possibilities are much more restricted, 
so it may as well be such periods that have the most inelastic demand as peak periods. 
The monopolist is utilising differences in demand elasticities and not differences in 
absolute demand. 
 
A monopolist will experience a binding reservoir constraint as in the social case 
illustrated in Figure 6 if the intersection of marginal revenue curves is to the left of the 
vertical through B representing the reservoir constraint (the demand curves have to be 
slightly redrawn to obtain this case). In a two-period case with the same availability of 
water in the first period with the binding reservoir constraint the monopolist cannot do 
better than adopt the social solution although the demand in period 1 is more elastic.  
 
Spilling of water can only take place in a period when the reservoir is filled up to the 
limit. The spilling then occurs if marginal revenue becomes zero before all available 
water in addition to the full reservoir is processed. Figure 7 illustrates such a case for 















Figure 7. Monopoly with reservoir constraint and spillage 
 
symbols have otherwise identical interpretations with Figure 6. The marginal revenue 
becomes zero before all available water AB in addition to a full reservoir BC is 
processed, resulting in a spillage in period 1. The water value becomes zero according 
to the second condition in (17). The monopoly price is markedly increased compared 
with the social planning price, indicated by the thin horizontal dotted line from the 
intersection point between the demand curve for period 1 and the thick vertical broken 
line from B being the reservoir wall. However, since the marginal revenue curve for 
period 2 is hitting the reservoir wall at a positive value the monopolist will utilise all 
available water in period 2, implying he has to charge the same price as in the social 
planning case. There is a positive value of the shadow price on the reservoir constraint 
in period 1 equal to the differences between the water values for the two periods. Since 
the water value for period 1 is zero due to the overflow, the shadow price on the 
reservoir constraint become equal to the water value in period 2. If the reservoir could 
be expanded the monopolist will increase his profit with this amount at the margin. If 
period 2 is a peak period we see that the monopolist is not increasing the price in this 
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5. Monopoly with trade- and reservoir-constraints 
 
We will now combine trade and restriction on the reservoir. The monopoly optimisation 
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The change from the case of trade without reservoir restriction is that the water values 
are now period specific. Two consecutive water values are connected through the value 
of the shadow price on the reservoir constraint, as seen from the third condition in (20). 
The possibility of overflow may restrict import of electricity since water is used until 
the marginal revenue becomes zero if that is necessary to avoid overflow. In export 
periods home price may be driven further up because there is a limit on the transfer 
from the previous period. If the reservoir constraint does not become binding we are 
back to the solution without a reservoir constraint. 
 
A bathtub illustration for two periods is provided in Figure 8. The figure is based on 
Figure 5. Since the import price is lowest in period 1 this period will again be the import 
period. Available water including inflow to the reservoir in period 1 is AC and inflow in 
period 2 is CD. The size of the reservoir is BC, indicated by  R, and the thinner solid 
vertical lines from B and C represents the reservoir. The reservoir is introduced from C 
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period 2. The import constraint is indicated to the left of the hydropower wall drawn 
with a solid line. In our case the full import capacity will not be utilised. But the full 
export capacity will be used, and this capacity is indicated by the first thick broken line 
to the left of the right-hand hydro wall drawn with a solid line. The final layout of the 
figure is the result of two stages for the two periods’ curves. In the first stage the 
demand-and marginal revenue- curves are anchored to the hydropower walls. The 
optimality conditions for the import period tell us that the marginal revenue curve 
should pass through the intersection between the import price line and the hydro wall 
through B. The demand- and marginal revenue curves are shifted horizontally to the left 
to allow this, and the stopping point is where the import wall is erected. If more import 
is tried the marginal revenue will become smaller than the import price. At least water 
AB has to be used home in period 1, and the market price matching this amount is 
higher than the import price. Therefore import is introduced until the marginal revenue 
is equal to the import price. Remember the analogy between imports and another 
technology for producing electricity. The final market price is found the usual way of 
moving vertically up to the demand curve. Since the import capacity is not fully utilised 
the shadow price b1 on this capacity is zero. The water value becomes equal to the 
import price for this period. The maximal amount of water is transferred to period 2. 
Checking period 2 there is in the first stage enough water to utilise the export capacity 
fully. The thick vertical broken line to the left of the hydropower wall then indicates the 
reduced availability for hydropower at home, and the demand- and marginal revenue-
curve are shifted horizontally to the left and anchored to the new wall. The intersection 
of the vertical water storage wall from B and the marginal revenue curve for period 2 
then gives the water value for period 2. The home price is found by the intersection of 
the hydropower storage line and the demand curve. The shadow price on the reservoir 
capacity is the difference between the two periods’ water values and is indicated in the 
figure. Since the export capacity is fully utilised its shadow price is positive and 
indicated as the difference between the export price and the water value for period 2. 
 
Entering thin dotted lines for the solution of the social case facilitates a comparison with 
the monopoly case. The import and export periods remain the same. The import 
capacity will now be fully utilized, so the demand curve for period 1 will be anchored at 
this import-extended wall, illustrated by the thin dotted vertical line to the left of the   23
wall in the monopoly case. In addition all water that cannot be transferred to period 2 
will be used at home in the import period, resulting in slightly more use of water in the 
social case in period 1 and a slightly lower price than in the monopoly case.  In period 2 
the full export capacity will not be used since using it will leave so little water to be 
consumed at home that the market price will increase above the exogenous export price.  
Only the amount will be exported that lead to the same price at home as the export 
price. The demand curve for period 2 must therefore pass through the intersection point 
of the export price line and the vertical storage wall from B. The demand curve is 
anchored (not shown in the figure) at the thin vertical dotted line to the right of the 
monopoly anchoring indicating the optimal export in the social case. In our illustration 
monopoly leads to a shift away from imports and over to exports. Since import is 
reduced the monopoly price is (slightly) higher in the import period. Since the same 
total amount of water is transferred to period 2 in the monopoly case the increased 
export leads to a (markedly) higher home price and a reduced consumption. The export 
period has the relatively most inelastic demand. 
 
 
6. Monopoly with hydro and thermal plants 
 
Hydro is in most countries combined with thermal capacity. Let us assume that a 
monopolist has full control over both hydro and thermal capacity. The thermal capacity 
is aggregated into a sector capacity by using an aggregate merit-order cost function with 
positive and increasing marginal cost (Førsund, 2005). For simplicity the cost function 
is the same for all periods. We will investigate how the monopolist utilises the two 
types of electricity technologies compared with the social solution. We assume that the 
monopolist is free to reduce production,
Th
t e , from the thermal units as he sees in his 
interest. A limited thermal capacity,
Th e , is assumed. The simplest restriction on hydro 
production of a total available amount of water is used. The demand functions are 
() tt px, where xt is the electricity demand supplied both by hydro and thermal capacity. 
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Concentrating on periods where both hydro and thermal are used the general result is 
that marginal revenue substitutes for the marginal willingness to pay in the social 
optimal solution: 
()(1)() hlq ¢ +==+ ( Th
ttttt pxce                                                                                       (24) 
The monopoly solution for a period is illustrated in Figure 9. If the monopolist’s water 
value is OB  in a period total energy supplied is indicated by the intersection of the 
horizontal water value line BB’ and the marginal revenue curve, yielding quantity Oe
H 
and monopoly price p
M. Both thermal and hydro capacity will be used according to the 
marginal revenue condition (24). The thermal capacity will be Oe
Th, determined by the 
intersection between the marginal cost curve and the water value line BB’ at b, and the 
hydro capacity (Oe
H - Oe
Th). The thermal capacity is not exhausted, so the shadow price 















Figure 9. Monopoly. Hydro and thermal capacity 
 
For two periods we may again use the bathtub diagram to illustrate the allocation of the 
two types of power on the two periods. In Figure 10 the length of the hydro bathtub, 





















h + ( (1) p  
O 
p(x) 




















     Thermal extensions 
 
?  ? 
   A           B                     C                           D          E  




Period 1  Period 2   26
functions are anchored at the hydro walls and extending to the left out to the capacity 
limit, indicated by a short vertical line, for period 1 and to the right for period 2. Using 
the result (24), with the shadow price on the thermal capacity constraint being zero, we 
have that the thermal extension of the bathtub is equal at each end; with AB in period 1 
and DE in period 2 and AB = DE. The equilibrium allocation is at point C, resulting in 
an allocation of AB thermal and BC hydro in period 1, and CD hydro and DE thermal in 
period 2. Introducing a reservoir constraint as in Figure 6 will not change the solution 
for the case of an intersection of the marginal revenue curves within the area delimited 
with the lines from B and C in that figure showing the storage possibilities. A 
monopolist will equate the water value with the marginal cost of thermal, and not the 
market price.  The use of thermal capacity may be reduced in all periods and will be 
base load unless a hydro reservoir constraint is binding. For such periods thermal 
capacity will also be used as peak. 
 
 
7. Dominant firm with a competitive fringe 
 
A pure monopoly in the electricity market i s not so common. There may be a 
dominating firm in terms of market share, but there will often be many smaller firms 
acting as price takers in the market. The existence of such a competitive fringe reduces 
the possibility of using market power because the fringe firms will supply according to 
the market price. For simplicity we will model the dominant firm by using the hydro 
model (1) without a reservoir constraint, but with a total water constraint, and model the 
competitive fringe by introducing a thermal sector represented by a cost function, as in 
the previous section, but without imposing a capacity constraint for the time being.  
 






































                                                                                              (25) 
The third constraint in (25) represents the behaviour of the competitive fringe. It 
supplies according to the price-taking profit maximising condition of equating market 
price with marginal costs. We can most conveniently proceed in the standard textbook 
way by using the third condition to derive the relationship between the supply of the 
fringe and the dominant producer’s supply of hydroelectricity. If the hydro producer 
supplies more the market price cet. par. goes down, but then the fringe contracts its 
output, assuming that the marginal cost is increasing. Differentiating 
  ()()(1,..,) ¢ +==
HThTh




















                                                              (27) 
Equation (26) defines implicitly the fringe output as a function of the output of the 
dominant firm. The relationship can be expressed by  
(),0(1,..,) ¢ =<=
ThH
tttt efeftT                                                                                       (28) 
Using the energy balance and the relationship between fringe output and output of the 
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The last bracketed term,  (1/) +
ThH
tt dede , on the rhs of the first condition in (30) is 
positive, but less than 1, resulting in the conditional marginal revenue becoming less 













                                 (31) 
The marginal revenue of the dominant firm is now reflecting the behaviour of the 
fringe. We have that the value of the conditional marginal revenue is closer to the 
market price, but still below this value compared with the expression for monopoly 
marginal revenue. Rearranging the first-order condition in (30) yields the following 
expression for the conditional marginal revenue: 











                                                    (32) 
The conditional marginal revenue function is closer to the demand function than the 
monopolist’s marginal revenue function due to two factors: the market share of the 
dominant firm is less than one in the first expression in (32) reducing the impact of the 
demand flexibility, and the second expression involving the quantity reaction of the 
fringe is positive. 
 
When the dominant firm is producing (30) tells us that the marginal revenues 
conditional upon the behaviour of the fringe shall all be equal and equal to the shadow 
price on water. It seems reasonable to assume that the dominant firm produces in all 
periods. Zero production implies that the shadow value of water is greater than the 
marginal cost of the fringe providing the whole market quantity. We will disregard this 
possibility.  
 
Figure 11 provides an  illustration in the two-period case. The broken lines are the 
conditional marginal revenue curves. The optimal solution is characterised by these 
conditional marginal revenues being equal and equal to the shadow price on water. The 























Figure 11. Dominant hydro and a thermal fringe 
 
the marginal cost. The demand- and conditional marginal revenue curves are anchored 
on the thermal walls, being endogenously determined, extending the energy bathtub. 
The thermal cost functions are anchored on the hydro bathtub walls. The use of thermal 
capacity, AB, in the relatively elastic period 1 is smaller than the use DE in the more 
inelastic period 2. In the illustration more hydro, BC, is used in period 1 than in period 2  
using CD. The market prices differ and the price is highest in the more inelastic period. 
Compared with the monopoly case the impact of the fringe is clearly to make the prices 
become more equal. A larger fringe capacity will be used in the more inelastic period 
forcing the market price down. This reduces the effectiveness of shifting water from 
period 2 to period 1.  
 
A constraint on the thermal capacity of the fringe will be an advantage for the dominant 
hydro firm if the constraint becomes binding. The first-order profit-maximising 
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The capacity constraint is 
Th e and its shadow price ?t. The capacity restriction implies 
the following response of the fringe: 
for()() ¢ =‡=
ThThTh
ttt eepxpce                                                                                  (34) 

















                                                                                (35) 
assuming that the dominating firm is producing. The conditional marginal revenue 
function shifts further away from the demand function. But since the demand flexibility 
is multiplied with the market share of the dominating firm this implies that the 
conditional marginal revenue function does not shift down as far as to the monopoly 
marginal revenue function.  
 
In the two-period case the situation can be illustrated as in Figure 12, building upon 
Figure 11. Total hydro resource is BD. The capacity of the thermal fringe is indicated 
by the small vertical line at the end of the marginal cost curve outside the thermal wall 
in period 1. The thermal capacity constraint is binding in period 2, but not in period 1. 
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wall dictated by the capacity constraint. The shift to the marginal revenue curve defined 
in (35) valid when the fringe output is constrained, is shown by the greater distance 
between the demand- and the marginal revenue curve. The opposite direction of shifts 
for the demand- and revenue curves implies an increase in period 2 price. Total supply 
is CE, the fringe supplies its maximal capacity DE and the dominant firm supplies CD. 
In period 1 the thermal capacity is not fully utilised and the conditional marginal 
revenue curve follows from (30) and lies relative closer to the demand curve as in 
Figure 11. The fringe supplies AB, less than its capacity, and the dominant firm supplies 
BC. When allocating water between the two periods the dominant hydro firm strikes a 
balance between marginal income from the two periods taking into consideration the 
lack of quantity response from the fringe in period 2 with full capacity utilisation and 
the contracting response in period 1 if more water is shifted to this period.  The shadow 
price on the thermal capacity constraint in period 2 is shown in the figure and is the 
difference between the market price and  the marginal cost at full capacity. Thus it 
measures the revenue to the fringe of expanding capacity marginally. The size of the 
capacity shadow price is also an indication for the dominant firm of the advantage 
enjoyed due to the fringe being capacity constrained. 
 
Hydro producers as a fringe 
Hydro producers can also constitute a fringe. However, the behaviour of the fringe can 
lead to analytical problems finding an optimal solution to the profit maximising 
problem of the dominating firm. Assuming that the fringe has at its disposal an amount 
of water corresponding to WF and has enough reservoir capacity to be perfectly flexible 
as to in which period to use the water, the fringe will use all its water in the period with 
the highest price. Although it is a fringe and therefore WF may be considerably smaller 
than  WD, where  WD is the dominant firm’s water resource, it can still have a 
considerable market share if all its water is used just in one period. It may happen that 
for a relatively high fringe water resource the solution is forced to be the social optimal 
solution with equal price for all periods.  
 
Introducing reservoir constraints for the fringe may introduce some market power for 
the dominant firm. But it is then also logical to introduce a reservoir constraint for the 
dominant firm. We will not develop such an analysis further, but just mention that in   32
Norway the reservoir capacity is quite concentrated on a small number of firms. Small 
hydropower firms tend to have relatively less reservoir capacity, thus opening up for the 
possibility of a group of dominating firms to exercise some market power. 
 
Oligopolistic markets 
It may easily become difficult to analyse oligopolistic markets involving hydro 
producers analytically. The basic problem is that such analyses have to be dynamic due 
to the basic dynamic nature of optimal adjustments of hydro producers with reservoir 
capacity. Even a duopoly involving a hydro firm and a thermal firm may become 
intractable without assuming special functional forms for the demand- and cost 
functions considering only two periods (Crampes and Moreaux, 2001). Since there is 
zero variable cost in the hydro case Bertrand competition moving prices is of special 
interest. A hydro producer can more easily drive down the price in the short run and 
force thermal capacity out and use water in order to create more scarcity in later periods. 
We will not attempt to develop such analyses here. 
 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
The basic strategy of a hydro producer exercising market power is to shift water trying 
to make marginal revenues equal.  Water is shifted away from periods with relatively 
inelastic demand to periods with relative elastic demand. The elasticity of demand may 
not follow a pattern of high demand peak periods being inelastic and low demand off-
peak periods  being elastic, as often assumed in the literature. This is an empirical 
question. A crucial question is also the period length to which a demand function refers. 
Are we talking about hours or longer time periods? In applied analyses shifts in the load 
duration curve is often used to aggregate into periods longer than one hour.  
 
Introducing technical constraints on the maneuverability of the hydro producer reduces 
generally the consequences of exercising market power. This is especially the case if a 
regulator prohibits spilling of water. But even when a monopolist is lead to use the 
social prices the shadow price of water is always below the social water value.  This 
may have implication for investments in production capacity.           33
Opening up for trade is often advocated as a way to increase competition. However, if a 
monopolist has control over the trade there is a systematic shift away from imports to 
exports and with the home price being higher than the trade prices. I ntroducing 
constraints on the interconnector capacity facilitating trade reduces markedly the 
consequences of a monopoly maintaining control with trade. This is somewhat 
paradoxical since increased trading possibilities are regarded positively, but it just 
underlines the importance of keeping trade away from the control of a monopolist. 
 
If a monopolist also has thermal capacity his water shifting strategy is maintained. 
However, the classical case of reducing production is now seen by the reduction of use 
of thermal capacity compared with the social solution. This result is coupled to the 
lower shadow price of water in the monopoly case, since the use of thermal capacity is 
governed by the equality of this shadow price and the marginal thermal cost. 
 
The existence of a competitive fringe reduces the possibility of exercising market power 
by a dominating hydro producer just as in the standard textbook case. If the fringe 
consist of hydro firms it may even lead to social prices being followed, since a hydro 
fringe will seek to use its water in the highest price period. 
 
Market interactions between few competitors involving hydro firms will be dynamic in 
nature due to reservoirs and solving analytically such market games may easily become 





Ambec, S. and J.A. Doucet (2003): “Decentralizing hydro power production”, 
Canadian Journal of Economics 36, 587-607. 
 
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J. B. and Wolak, F. A. (2002): “Measuring market 
inefficiencies in California’s restructured wholesale electricity market,”  American 
Economic Review 92(5), 1376-1405. 
 
      Bushnell, J. (2003): A mixed complementarity model of hydrothermal electricity 
competition in the Western United States, Operations Research 2003, 51(1) January-
February.  
 
   34
      Crampes, C. and Moreaux, M. (2001): “Water resource and power generation,” 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 975-997. 
 
Førsund, F. R. (2005): “ Hydropower Economics”, Memorandum 30/2005 from 
Department of Economics, University of Oslo. 